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**Globalisation and Urban Violence:  
Some reflections on the situation in Frankfurt**

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## **Globalisation and Urban Violence: Some reflections on the situation in Frankfurt**

Globalisation and violence are seemingly closely interlaced social constructs. As many scholars have underlined, cities are deserving special attention with regard to the analysis of globalisation and its effects. This paper aims at intensifying the debate of how violence is involved in the interaction of the local and the global. It is questioning those approaches which might be called “structuralist” and following a clear direction of causes: globalisation as the subject and the cities as object. It will first show, that the general perception arisen after September eleven are misleading, as the interrelationship between globalisation and urban violence are not basically generated by radical Moslems out of the periphery. A second scientific approach focuses the creation of new inequalities inside the cities due to the creation of global cities. Struggling with this overwhelming models of debate, it is necessary to outline the “limits of globalisation” (Rieger/Leibfried 2003) while talking about a particular case of urban violence. How much are the images of uncertain cities from US-cities causing the German perception of our dangerous cities and how much has to be seen as a consequence of very local circumstances? On the basis of first findings about Frankfurt, this paper will reflect some conceptually open question around the influence of globalisation, urban life, and security.

### **9-11: A guiding picture?**

A small Cessna is circling around the skyscrapers of Frankfurt. The world is threatened by the prophecies of Osama Ben Laden and his call for suicide attacks on the West. The pilot is not responding to warnings of the airport tower personal. The airforce is activated, the country stops breathing. Will we experience a repetition of

the attacks on September eleven? After the psychotic pilot has given up, he explained his behaviour with reference to the explosion of the Challenger ten years ago. He had seen that on the television and wanted to commemorate one of the victims. Certainly, he was not a follower of the Al-Quiada. What might be well interesting his general knowledge of the WTC attack which has motivated him to decide on his own action.

After the tragedy of New York, a wide public debate has enrolled on the question what these skyscrapers have stood for. Although, it might be difficult what symbolic target was meant to be destroyed, many voices have expressed three concerns that the WTC has not only been hated as signs of the American superiority but as the heart of urban life in an ethnic divers and liberal city as well. In this regard, Mike Davis has analysed the attacks as aggression against the city as such. In his book about "dead cities" he shows the long historical line of the killing of urban societies (Davis 2002). Urban life as such has been hit in its self-esteem that it can handle the conflicts *inside* its spatial order. The vulnerability of the city through external conflicts was demonstrated painfully. New York and potentially other urban centres are as Weberian collective actors the spatial address of a globalisation of urban violence. The attacks are, seen in this way, not a single phenomena but can be lined in a series of "new urban wars" that are the consequence of an increasing global society where new lines of conflict and alliance are drawn. To a certain extend, we can understand them as an helpless attempt to find a physical nominator to attack. While globalisation has disembedded social conflicts, the new urban wars are seeking visible attractions for the invisible lines of globalised conflicts (Appadurai 1995).

As the dangerous but confused pilot in Frankfurt uses the pictures of 9-11 to express his personal need, the global accessibility to pictures can be seen as one of the most important features of cultural globalisation. The attacks have made us aware that there is a global society developing which expresses different interests and views on the world within one single semiotic setting. We have to acknowledge that we are all, in different ways, part of a globally organised mediascape where the notion of pictures and the general code of communication are integrating different life worlds. As a result of this process, it is not only that there is a conflict created between local and global cultures. This has been the concern about globalisation so far. Within the codification of most divers semantics, these conflicts are globalised and integrated into the global culture. The attacks are therefore not an expression of resistance

against the globalisation of local (Islam) culture, there are the results of it. Discussing the relevance of 9-11 as a guiding picture for the scientific analysis of globalised urban violence, the paradigmatic value lies more in the recognition of the globalisation of pictures as motivating factors for violence.

### **Cities alive**

The relationship between violence and urban life can be traced back through the starting point of urbanisation. As it is assumed very often, the city seems to be a place that evokes more often violent behaviour than the countryside does. Cities have been suffering from the negative cliché that they are more dangerous as such. Although a large area of work in urban sociology covers the issue of “delinquency”, as the Chicago School addressed the phenomena, a simple conclusion on the appearance of violence in cities have been mostly avoided. From a century of research on urban gangs, street violence and crime, we might conclude that the simple linking of violence to the process of urbanisation lacks an understanding on the spatial dimension of urban life. More or less, the distinction between the physical place and the social space needs to be outlined as to debate what globalisation in this context has changed.

The necessary differentiation means more or less an acknowledgement that non-place related actions have to be included in the analysis of urban violence. Confusingly, globalisation is seen by many scholars as to change the social construction of places and cities. It has been widely recognised, that the physical distances are no longer a hinder to enable communication between geographically far distant places. The following debate on the “end of geography” however has shown, that this process of “space-time-compression” is not evolving equally and in a homogenous manner. The so called network society is embedded in a historical transformation which stamps from an international division of labour and power, which has been generated in the colonial and industrial period of world history. As a consequence, the new centrality of places with its financial and economic centres in New York, London, and Tokyo reflects the old nation-state related world. In the

analysis of the hierarchy of “global cities”, the growing interconnectedness of people shows a pattern that is framed by the access to means of mobility. Zygmunt Bauman conceptualised the divide between the “global rich” who are gaining all benefits of the new communication, transport and information technologies and the “local poor” who are encaptured in the narrow circumstances of their origins (Bauman 2000). In the same sense, the social division of global cities have been understood as developing a polarisation of rich and poor inhabitants. With the metaphor of the “dual city” an image was found that seems to become the more obvious the more gated communities and an ideological shift from “war against poverty” to “zero tolerance” can be observed. In many publications, the issue has been addressed with some more precise concepts as the “divided city” (Fainstein/Gordon/Harloe 1992), the new “urban underclass”-approach and the reference to social “exclusion”. What is more or less common to all of these reflections is the belief in a relationship between globalisation, the social composition of the city and the appearance of frightening phenomena of anomie and one of its results: violence.

Research in this framework has delivered an overwhelmingly conviction about the existing effects of globalisation and social inequality. Nevertheless, things are not that easy. Looking at the “local poor” in those global cities we will find a high share of immigrant population. Being a poor asylumseeker in Frankfurt can mean flight from an oppressive and deprived fight for survival in the country of origin. The appearance of a wide spread jo-jo migration is due to the fact that immigration networks are organised to live on different places. Here, basic concepts of sociology as “home” have become questionable (Eade 1997). The globalisation of the cities means in first place that we have to deal with increasingly de-embedded minorities, at home in more than one place. But mobility is not restricted to migrants. On the contrary, the non-immigrant city dwellers is mentally constantly on the move. The flaneur and the tourist have become predominant role models for acting in urban life with globalised semiotic settings. These roles are learned in cognitive socialisation processes where expectations is codified into specific semiotic settings (Zerubavel 1997). In this way, even those staying as Kant their whole life in Königsberg now can receive and participate in the imaginative worlds. Cities are increasingly themening their urban design to enable this mental trips without moving physically (Sorkin 1997).

## **Dangerous cities**

Anomie, diversity, and mobility are all making up a new urban cocktail in which violence is one of the most important, if not the essential, experience. While the European history is full of examples of urban violence, the contrary is also true. Cities have been regarded to produce some kind of safety. They enabled a market where goods and services could be exchanged in a regulated way and have thereby produced the security of the city as such. Crime was an exception which has to be brought before the judge. Heterogeneity and conflict have been appeased and moderated behind the city's wall. The city has in this perspective been attractive for all those who wanted to flee the constraining homogeneity of rural life. "City air frees", the old German saying goes.

The globalisation of the imaginary world has also influenced the general and scientific perception of cities. A broader debate about the "Americanisation" of German cities have reached the discourse on urban development in Germany (Häußermann). While this is an ever green theme in urban studies, the question of the unsafeness of urban environment has been re-entering the scientific agenda. The issue has been focussed in the last years annual meeting of the urban sociologists and publications are planned and already available. It seems obvious, that findings about US-American cities are seen as the starting point of the reflection of the scientists. Scholars like Neil Smith and his work on the "revanchist cities" are widely perceived (Smith 1996). In a more sophisticated way, the scientific community is reflecting American images as they are transported en masse to the German audience as an integral part of their mediascape. Since the early seventies, the "Streets of San Francisco" and "Shaft" have influenced our understanding of urban life more than we are willing to recognise. What is questionable, is the framing of the analysis of urban violence and security with the guiding scientific paradigm that violence has to do, in the first place, with social inequality. Intermediate factors are preventing the simple apprehension of the American situation to the Frankfurt case and, in general, to European cities as such. It has been pointed out that the welfare state is intertwined with the development of the social cohesion of cities in many ways (Musterd 2003). We can moreover discuss, whether the European city is just of a different type of city and as a historical product the result of an integrative societal organisation unknown in other parts of the world (Le Galès 2002).

After emancipation from those pictures of Los Angeles and their craving for universal recognition, the question of a growing anomie induced by globalisation remains open. There appears of lack of analysis, in which way the relationship could be defined. As a consequence of the current debates, the case of Frankfurt will be more or less discussed *ex negativo*, in search for other conceptual approaches to the unknown line of causes: globalisation-urban life-violence.

### **Frankfurt as a Dual City**

A major contribution to the debate on urban sociology has been titled as “new urbanity”, a book title by two outstanding German urban sociologists (Häußermann/Siebel 1987). The authors followed implicitly the dual city-perspective laid down by Castells and others (Castells 2000). On the background of a shrinking working class, a new urban lifestyles, and other appearances, Häußermann and Siebel are advocating a revival of the European urbanity providing liveable cities for all social groups. As a consequence of this focus setting, public debate and urban studies have taken up the fear of a polarised city (Wehrheim 2003). It seems that Frankfurt speaks the most to the imaginary of those who want to see US-like phenomena slowly entering German cities. In a series of books, the former mayor for city planning in Frankfurt, Martin Wentz had invited researchers and planners to express their view on Frankfurt in this regard. A volume as “City-World” can be characterised by the ambivalent attempt to see the city as “global” as others and to warn for situations as in cities of this highest league (Noller/Prigge/Ronneberger 1994). In explicit reference to authors as Saskia Sassen (1991) or others have prolonged this research narrative. The basis of these publications can be regarded as highly discussible. In comparison, the opportunities to use statistical data in Germany are not allowing to use indicators as possible in London or New York. Due to regulations laid down in the German Information Act, there are no data available allowing substantial analyses of structural components of inhabitants. Other works have therefore used sophisticated qualitative research methods or descriptions (Hutz et al. 1995). It remains, however, an interesting question whether the framing of this research into the hypothesis of a dual city allows the reflection on the appropriateness of the polarisation thesis as such. Frankfurt has been proclaimed as “New Service City” (Noller/Ronneberger 1995) and this has been linked to a

globalised form of urban development that defines social relationships in physical environments (Noller 1999).

The dual city-perspective has also been used in research that has been dedicated to the area of urban violence and security. It is attracting attention that Frankfurt again is the city which attracts most of the scholars on this issue. One of the most important works might be the publication of Hans-Gerd Jaschke on "Public Security in the Conflicts of Cultures" (1997). Jaschke is more or less following the polarisation hypothesis. The assumed polarised spatial and social areas are his point of departure. In his book, Jaschke shows the shift in political work areas and sees this is a sign of a consequent security policy in a globalised dual city. While Jaschke is not questioning the scientific narrative wherein first comes globalisation then polarisation, another author strictly rejects this influences. Hubert Beste has researched on violence and crime in German cities and came to the conclusion that there is no evidence "to compare the German situation with the US cities" (26). Instead, the author points out that the political debate about security has changed. According to his "morphology of power", the personal feeling of (in)security has been promoted and installed as policy paradigm. He traces the shift on the political agenda back to the constellation of political interests. As a result of discursive practices, violence and security are no longer embedded in a public debate about reasons for uncertainty. In other words, Beste is of the opinion that the Frankfurt debate on safety has not much to do with the status of the city in the interurban competition and its flair as the German global city.

### **Frankfurt without polarisation**

How little the assumed chain of reasons globalisation-dual city-violence can be hold up, if we look at the so called "Bürgerbefragung", a representative surveys that has been conducted since 1994. With this instrument, the Bureau for Statistics in Frankfurt intends to have an insight in the appearing of the segregation processes and to learn about the opinions of the city dwellers with regard to certain issues. Both parts of the survey can be considered as crucial to testify the above questioned line of argument concerning urban violence and globalisation. If segregation is first taken into account, then the results of the surveys shows no evidence for following the hypothesis of growing "polarisation". The index on dissimilarity (ID) for measuring the



residential segregation of ethnic groups is compared to US-rates very low (Musterd/Ostendorf 1998). The dual city-concept comes even more difficult to apply on Frankfurt while taken into consideration that the ID has fallen from 0,18 to 0,15 within the period of 1987 to 2000. This is even more noteworthy for the rate of immigrant population has been risen from 20 to 28 per cent of the whole population during these years. Within the German context, the ID is half of others never considered to have anything to do with globalisation. As the dual city-metaphor reflects social inequality also besides the ethnic diversity, it is remarkable that the ID with regard to the social group of unemployed or receivers of state benefits has not shown any development. They remain on the low level of 0,11 and 0,17.

Focusing on certain areas, a cummulation of problems can be observed. Nevertheless, even in those “hot spots” (Brennpunkte) as they are called in Germany, the situation has been not worsening. Most visual, the area close to the Railway Station (“Bahnhofsviertel”) and attached neighbourhoods (Gutleutviertel, Gallus) are considered to be a social space with a concentration of problematic dimensions of social inequality. The percentage of non-German population was rising from 53 % (1987) to 62 % (1994) but has then fallen again to 58 % (2000). While unemployment in the city has been decreasing, the density of unemployed persons has not been pushed during the last 15 years.

Especially the change in trend can not be explained within the framework of “growing polarisation”. What has stimulated the fantasy of the Global City-scholars was the increasing immigration population until 1994. Since eight years, this development stagnated. In particular, the Brennpunkte have lost immigrant population and the middle class areas showed an increasing percentage of immigrant residents. Here, we find two possible explanations. First, we have to acknowledge wider migrations patterns within the city and to the surrounding suburban areas. Secondly, there seems to be evidence that the immigrant population has upgraded their residential addresses (see table 1). This could be either the effect of a downgrading of the pulling urban areas or it could mean that non-German dwellers have socially moved upward and can afford to live in “better off” areas. Whatever will be found out by future research on this point, the described development does not support any vision on Frankfurt that presumes a city polarised by globalisation.

	Total Population	German citizens	Non-German citizens
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	2000	87-94	94-00	2000	87-94	94-00	2000	87-94	94-00
Working class area	15,9	3,5	0,4	15,2	-3,0	2,5	17,6	50,8	0,7
“Brennpunkte”	5,6	12,0	-19,3	3,7	-12,2	-8,9	10,0	46,5	-28,4
Inner-city	4,9	6,4	-6,8	4,5	-7,6	-9,6	6,1	56,6	-7,6
Average areas	39,4	5,7	- 6,7	38,8	-6,0	-7,1	40,8	56,0	-7,1
Middle class Areas	18,4	2,9	-0,2	19,8	-6,0	-1,9	14,8	50,9	7,4
Upper class areas	9,1	2,8	4,2	9,9	-4,7	-0,2	6,9	53,9	23,7
Suburban areas	6,9	8,2	6,5	8,1	2,0	6,3	3,9	58,0	12,7
<b>City in total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>6,5</b>	<b>-5,0</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>-4,9</b>	<b>-5,1</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>51,2</b>	<b>-4,9</b>

Tab.1. Development of seven social areas in Frankfurt from 1987 till 2000.

### Frankfurt in its own words

A more subtle hypothesis on the relationship between urban violence and globalisation does not link the appearance of insecurity to social polarisation but a wider spread phenomena that could be described as “uncertainty” or with the classical concept of sociology: anomie. The argument has been brought forward that the flexibilisation of work relationships has increased the psychological pressure on the individual to find its way through society. As Richard Sennett has demonstrated by his experiences in the gastronomy of New York, the “flexible man” has become common in our everyday life (Sennett ). From a conceptual point of view, there remains the question to be answered in which way we could link the deregulation of economic structures to the phenomena of anomie and further to urban violence. In the following, we want to ask the question in a different manner. It is not satisfying to see the flexibilisation of time and space constructs merely from a point of “loss”. There is some sad note in Sennett’s description and worry about what the new forms of labour will mean for the life world in cities. We will leave this track, as we have to learn how people construct their life by new narratives. In the following, we will argue

that the real linkage between globalisation and urban violence is a fiction: the narrative of safety.

The inhabitants of Frankfurt are interviewed about their important issues on an annual basis. With a broad survey that fulfils the acknowledged criteria of being representative for all people in Frankfurt, we have an inside view on what the Frankfurt people are thinking of their city. This survey has been conducted since 1994 and includes some questions on crime for the last four years. Most interesting is the open question, what the interviewed persons think is the biggest problem of Frankfurt. Another relevant indicator of the subjective reception are questions as “When you are in the inner-city at night (for example after a show), how safe do you feel?” Besides, there is a question on how content people feel with the public security.

	Public Security		“Crime is the biggest problem” (in %)	Crime figures
	Content (in %)	Not content (in %)		
1994	8	68	57	133.375
1995	10	63	51	130.706
1996	10	62	43	127.425
1997	9	63	48	125.537
1998	12	57	41	123.083
1999	15	51	35	113.040
2000	18	48	28	104.094

Tab.2: Development of subjective and objective crime indicators.

What can be observed over the years, gives little indication that there might be some direct relationship with the constantly proceeding processes of deregulation, unemployment and flexibility in the economic sphere of the city. Crime started to be the overwhelming problem of the citizenry. In the succeeding years, however, the fear of crime crumbled down to nearly the half of the percentage of the year 1994. There seems to be significant correlation with the number of positive responses about the public security. As people are appreciating the more the quality of public safety, the fear of crime declines. Nevertheless, crime remains a mayor concern in

the surveys. Only one of three people felt really safe in the inner-city of Frankfurt, in 1999. That year, the figures showed that the interviewees are as most content about the public safety and only 35 per cent think that crime is the biggest problem of the city.

The answers of the city dwellers are thus showing a very interesting incongruence. How can it be that one does not see crime as the biggest problem, is content about public safety and still lives in fear while walking through the city centre? A further analysis of the survey allows to, again, point out the importance of pictures and narratives which might be the core of cultural globalisation. Insecurity, the Frankfurt surveys show, is merely a product of perception. In 1999, it was asked why people are so afraid and the answers are quite simply pointing at the medial distribution of violent pictures and the retold experiences of close friends and relevant others. In other words, the fear for crime is not based on own experiences and stands in no relationship with the objective development of crime (lowering constantly) and the provision of public safety (ever improving). It is no surprise that certain social groups are more frightening violence than others do. Women, the elderly and those who are in general discontent with the city are feeling most threatened to become a victim of crime. While this result might have been likely to expect, there are many other items that are only underlying the difficulty of the heterogeneous phenomena "insecurity". It is interesting to see, moreover; that there are important observations about those inhabitants of Frankfurt who are feeling safe. Clear linkages can be made between high income, participation in higher education, and a general positive view on the city. It appears therefore that there is some "inner safety" necessary to not perceive your city as being "unsafe". Members of these social groups are not relating their feeling of safety to the presence of police forces or security service but to social requirements and the quality of the built environment. While the political debate about the political control has been high on the agenda during the last years and an issue in election campaigns, the results of the survey show that there is only a limited effect of activities employed in the run of public debates. The installation of an information point and the increased visibility of police force on the streets have supported those inhabitants who already felt safe in the inner-city, while insecurity has not been reduced in general.

### **Mobility as a dividing line**

If something is as impressive in global times, it is the increased mobility of services, goods, people and pictures. It makes sense, in this way, to sort out those participants of the survey which are using the new techniques of communication to be in the world wide web (see Lohde-Reiff 2001 for details). The increasing abilities for travel, communication, and transport are assumed to lie at the core of globalisation. Far reaching concepts are developed to express the societal novelties implemented by the technological innovations. In tendency, some authors favour to speak of a global network society instead of or in accomplishing the structural framework of the “global flow” (Castells 2000). It is in this sense, that the debate on globalised urban violence requires an approach that defines a social category of “mobile” subjects or actors. As described above, purely structural elements are not showing a satisfying explanation why people are fearing crime. While there is a correlation to the indicators as education, income, and age, the linkage is much too diffuse to be accepted as explanatory result of the considered relationships between social change and subjective perceptions.

To test the assumption that “mobile” inhabitants are influenced in their capacity to cope with the changing global mediascapes and the inherent feeling of uncertainty, the construction of a social group of “mobile” persons have been undertaken. Group member are stating that they are using the internet. Selected are 296 interviews from the 1997 survey. They represent 21 per cent of the whole sample and are slightly over-representing women (48 %). With regard to their educational background, the selected persons are equally representing those with the highest or second highest diplomas. The same pattern of distribution is reproduced in the age categories (18-34 and 35-49 years). Their financial position can be described as above average. Forty percent earn more than 3,000 Euro/month. We expect this constructed group of

mobile Frankfurter to express to lesser extent fear of becoming a victim of crime. Indeed, the mobile groups feels overwhelmingly secure. Eighty percent are – in comparison to only twenty per cent of the “immobile” – not afraid of urban violence. Looking, however, only on those who are feeling insecure, the situation is not that clear. The percentage of “insecure” mobile persons counts for 60 per cent and for 40 within the “immobile” group. In conclusion, we have a certain hint that mobility (in the internet) influences positively those who are feeling safe in the city. Uncertainty, on the other hand, seems to be generated in an still unknown way.

Another examination of the mobile group with dummy coded items should bring us closer to view the characteristics of this group. Limited by the survey design, the most interesting question about media use cannot be unfolded. Nevertheless, there are some discussible interrelations which are so far not considered in debates about urban violence (see tab. 3).

	Mobile Persons		
	“feeling unsafe”	“feeling safe”	Strength of correlation (Cramer’s V)
Men	34,4	65,6	0,20
Women	53,4	46,6	0,19
Knowledge of second language	22,7	77,3	<b>0,67</b>
Access to internet at home	2,3	97,7	<b>0,63</b>
Voluntary work	28,0	72,0	0,21
Member of organisations	35,5	64,5	0,19
“Feeling threatened by media reports”	56,0	44,0	0,18
“Feeling unsafe by reports of others”	46,1	53,9	0,03
“Feeling unsafe because of own experiences”	44,2	55,8	0,00
Resident since > 15 years	60,8	39,2	<b>0,50</b>
Resident since > 5 years	14,3	85,7	0,24
Resident less than 5 years	2,3	97,7	0,39
Not content with	57,1	42,9	0,11

neighbourhood			
Not content with the city	53,8	46,2	0,07
Not content with the house	42,1	57,9	0,01

Tab.3: Characteristics of the mobile population of Frankfurt.

While there are some findings as the gender difference in the perception of the city, it is obvious that the highest correlation can be found in the sphere of mobility. The knowledge of a second language and the home access to the world wide web are the strongest ties we can observe. Beyond this evident correlation, the pattern of mobility is strongly connected with an active attitude to life. Participation in voluntary work and social life seems to produce a feeling of security for the mobile Frankfurters. And once again, the relationship between the scare of becoming a victim of violence and crime has little or even nothing to do with what has been experienced. Instead, media reports are seemingly to be more influential even to the constructed social group of the mobiles. The fear for crime is most striking for those who have not been victim themselves, but have perceived reports by others and by the media.

As neighbourhood security has been an important issue in many urban planning debates, the findings of the survey should also been regarded in the context of political claims for initiatives like neighbourhood watch and gated areas. As tab. 3 shows, the feeling of unsafeness is the most demonstrable for those who are resident for more than 15 years. Newcomers are less aware of possible crime dangers. It is important to notice, that we do not speak of a group that has been growing old in the city. As the mobile group has been designed as being only 49 years old and younger, the well known relationship between age and fear does not come to be the origin of the correlation between fear for crime and duration of residence, here. While it remains an open question, why living in your own neighbourhood for a longer time makes you feel increasingly less secure, we might draw the preliminary conclusion that there is some process of *learning* to feel insecure. It appears to be evident that the perception of neighbourhood is changed by external processes. The intrusion of global pictures should be taken into consideration as the medium for this adaptation of an attitude that rattles long term residents. This line of argument is further supported by the fact that the survey does not indicate any relationship between the dissatisfaction with the city as such or the own neighbourhood in particular and the

feeling of insecurity. This way, the scope of physical measurements in urban planning to enhance security have to be regarded as critical

## Conclusion

With the focus on Frankfurt, the assumed German global city, this paper discussed the relationship between globalisation and urban violence. As the development of crime shows no significant changes neither in Frankfurt nor other German cities, globalisation is not directly connected to urban criminality. Urban theorists have suggested to see the appearance of growing violence as an effect of the social polarisation in global cities. The case of Frankfurt, however, questions the linear chain of this argumentation. No evidence has been found that there is a growing social inequality in terms of residential segregation. While other forms of “new or hidden poverty” could not be explored within the scope of this article, more subtle processes of social exclusions have not reached such a dimension that they could be identified in social area analysis. Alternatively, globalisation could be more described as interconnectedness (Hannerz 1996) whose effects are more unclear, so far. There seems to be an important correlation between the mobility (as a part of the global connectedness) and the fear for violence. We have to understand the *scared* violence as the most important dimension of the globalisation of crime. With regard to cities, the percussive of world wide distributed pictures seems to restructure the basic attitude of city dwellers towards their territorial surroundings. Those who are (longer) residing are losing their ability to cope with the cacophonous voices transported by global media. Staying at home creates a fear of becoming a victim of violence. In this sense, the pictures of the attacks on the World Trade Centre might be considered not as the newly emerging form of urban violence but as part of a globalised narrative creating diffuse fears everywhere.



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